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i. introduction
Does government policy play a role in in£uencing the rate and direction of technological change? Most governments appear to believe so. A wide variety of instruments is used by governments to foster technological change: tax cuts, subsidies to R&D, the formation of R&D consortia and national R&D laboratories are but a few examples. In this paper we focus on the relationship between government subsidies to R&D and company ¢nanced R&D in Israel.
The Israeli experience is of interest because its high-tech sector boomed in the course of the last decade, both by national and international standards. Government R&D and innovation policies are perceived as crucial elements of this success story (Trajtenberg, 2002) . Yet, there is no quantitative assessment of the e¡ectiveness of these policies. This paper attempts to close the gap by focusing on the question: Are R&D subsidies stimulating or displacing company ¢nanced R&D in Israeli manufacturing ¢rms? That is, is there an`additionality e¡ect' to R&D subsidies? The lessons learned from the Israeli case should be of interest to countries implementing or contemplating the use of subsidy schemes to promote R&D. 1 An R&D subsidy can have a direct and an indirect e¡ect on ¢rm performance. The direct e¡ect comes about through the increase in total R&D expenditures, holding company ¢nanced R&D constant. Griliches and Regev (2001) estimate the separate e¡ects of subsidized and company ¢nanced R&D expenditures on output and productivity of Israeli manufacturing ¢rms. Their ¢ndings point to signi¢cant and, in some cases, very large e¡ects of subsidized R&D on output. The indirect e¡ect operates through the response of company ¢nanced R&D expenditures to the subsidy. If the R&D subsidy displaces own R&D expenditures, the total e¡ect on productivity may be lower than what the Griliches and Regev estimates suggest. On the other hand, if it stimulates own R&D expenditures, then the e¡ects of the subsidy are magni¢ed. Thus, an understanding of the relationship between R&D subsidies and company ¢nanced R&D is necessary for a correct assessment of the role of R&D subsidies in boosting productivity.
The precise way in which R&D subsidies are administered is likely to make a di¡erence. In Israel, the largest R&D subsidy program is the one implemented by the O¤ce of the Chief Scientist (OCS) at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Firms apply for an R&D grant on a project by project basis. All ¢rms intending to export part of the outcome of the R&D project qualify for participation in the program. The vast majority of the subsidies granted represents 50% of the agreed upon R&D budget. Thus, upon approval of the project, the ¢rm commits to match, dollar-by-dollar, the subsidy received by the OCS. If the project is commercially successful, the ¢rm pays the subsidy back in the form of royalties. Thus, the grant becomes a loan conditional on the success of the project.
The R&D subsidy can be viewed as lowering the private cost of the project. Receiving the subsidy may therefore turn an unpro¢table project into a pro¢table one to be pursued by the ¢rm. Or it may speed up the completion of a project already under way. If subsidized R&D involves setting up or upgrading research facilities (labs) then the ¢xed costs of other current and future R&D projects are lowered, increasing their probability of being undertaken. The learning and know-how gained in the subsidized project can also spill-over to other current and future projects thereby enhancing their prospects of success. For all these reasons, the R&D subsidy can stimulate current and future private R&D expenditures.
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The standard rationale for government support of R&D is rooted in the belief that some form of market failure exists that leads the private sector to underinvest in R&D (Arrow, 1962) . To a large extent, underinvestment in R&D occurs because the social bene¢ts from new technologies are di¤cult to appropriate by the private ¢rms bearing the costs of their discovery, and because imperfect capital markets may inhibit ¢rms from investing in socially valuable R&D projects (Griliches, 1998; Romer, 1990) . Publicly supported R&D ought to be augmenting or complementing private R&D e¡orts. It would therefore be surprising, and contrary to stated goals, if R&D subsidies were to substitute for private R&D.
Yet, some empirical evidence suggests that some substitution between private and government funded R&D does indeed occur. In the U.S., Wallsten (2000) showed that a subset of publicly traded, young, technological intensive ¢rms, reduced their R&D spending in the years following the award of a Small Business Innovation Research grant, while Busom (2000) ¢nds that in about 30% of the Spanish ¢rms in her sample, public funding fully crowds out privately ¢nanced R&D. On the other hand, Klette and Moen (1998) conclude that the R&D subsidies were successfully targeted at ¢rms that have signi¢cantly expanded their R&D expenditures, and that there is little tendency for crowding out in their sample of high-technology Norwegian ¢rms.
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One way to rationalize the possibility of`crowding out' is to argue that government bureaucrats are under strong pressure to avoid the appearance of`wasting' public funds and, therefore, may tend to fund projects with higher success probabilities and with clearly identi¢able results, i.e., projects that are likely to have high private rates of return. These are projects that could have been ¢nanced by the ¢rm either from internal or external funds, suggesting that the R&D subsidies are in fact super£uous and may be crowding out private R&D resources. If, however, the funds released by the subsidy are invested in other R&D projects which, because of liquidity constraints, could not have been undertaken before these funds became available, the subsidy may be accomplishing its stated purpose, albeit in an indirect way.
Another channel through which publicly funded R&D projects may 2 The terms`company ¢nanced',`private' and`own' R&D expenditures are used interchangeably. 3 In their review of a wide range of empirical studies, David, Hall and Tool (2000) conclude that drawing general conclusions about the e¡ect of R&D subsidies is problematic because results di¡er considerably among the studies due to variation in samples and in econometric methodologies.
crowd out privately ¢nanced R&D is through their e¡ect on the price of inelastically supplied R&D inputs . Suppose the subsidy does indeed turn an unpro¢table project into a pro¢table one. Then, if the costs of hiring additional R&D personnel are high, the ¢rm may decide to discontinue a previously pro¢table project. The commitment to undertake the subsidized project may crowd out other non-subsidized projects. This factor may be of importance in Israel because of the serious shortage of scientists and engineers in some high-tech areas. 4 It is important to realize that from the ¢rm's point of view, the R&D subsidy eases possible liquidity constraints because it is cheaper to apply for a government subsidy than to raise funds in the capital market. Thus, the ¢rm views the R&D subsidy as a substitute source of ¢nancing and not necessarily as a stimulating force to do more R&D. Once a subsidy is received, and the ¢rm commits to undertake the subsidized R&D project, the ¢rm can adjust its portfolio of R&D projects, initiating new ones and/ or closing old ones. Any analysis of the e¡ect of the subsidy needs to take these changes into account.
As this discussion shows, the crux of the matter for evaluating the e¡ect of the R&D subsidy is to know what the ¢rm would have spent on R&D had it not received the subsidy. This counterfactual information, however, is not available. The estimation method used in this paper essentially attempts to estimate the missing expected counterfactual by the mean outcome of some group of ¢rms.
Using data on Israeli manufacturing ¢rms in the 1990s, we ¢nd evidence suggesting that the R&D subsidies granted by the OCS greatly stimulated company ¢nanced R&D expenditures for small ¢rms but had a negative e¡ect on the R&D of large ¢rms, although not statistically signi¢cant. For the small ¢rms, a subsidy of one New Israeli Shekel (NIS) ¢rst displaces private R&D by about 3 NIS, but subsequently increases R&D by about 14 NIS. Thus, overall, the private R&D of small ¢rms increased by about 11 NIS. Because most subsidies go to the large ¢rms, a subsidy of one NIS generates 0.23 additional NIS of company ¢nanced R&D on average. This estimate, however, is not signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero.
One interpretation of these results is that large ¢rms get subsidies for projects that would have been undertaken even in the absence of the subsidy, whereas small ¢rms do not. This di¡erential e¡ect of the subsidy may re£ect a higher cost of raising capital by small ¢rms than by large ¢rms. The time pattern of the estimated e¡ects also suggests that in the presence of some type of constraint (either capital or skilled labor), the commitment to undertake the subsidized R&D project may result in other R&D projects' being temporarily crowded out.
Section 2 describes the main features of R&D support in Israel and the data analyzed in this paper. Section 3 presents the main conceptual and empirical issues that arise in the estimation of the subsidy e¡ect while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Conclusions close the paper.
ii. r&d support in israel
II(i). OCS Programs
The Israeli government funnels its support of R&D projects through several channels. The most important source is the R&D grants given by the O¤ce of the Chief Scientist (OCS) at the Ministry of Industry and Trade as mandated by the Law for the Encouragement of Industrial Research and Development of 1984.
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The main program administered by the OCS is the support of standard R&D projects. Qualifying ¢rms submit grant applications for speci¢c R&D projects. The OCS reviews the application and approves it if the project satis¢es some speci¢ed criteria based on technological and commercial feasibility. About 70% of the applications are approved (Trajtenberg, 2002) . In fact, the OCS is mandated by law to subsidize all eligible proposals; there is no ranking of the proposals. Moreover, the principle of`neutrality' precludes the OCS from selecting projects according to technological ¢eld or any other such considerations.
If approved, the ¢rm receives a grant from the OCS equal to a percentage of the estimated (and approved) project-speci¢c R&D expenditure. This percentage varies between 30% and 66% depending on the circumstances. If the goal of the R&D project is to create a new project or industrial process or to make signi¢cant improvements in existing ones, the grant is 50% of the approved R&D expenditures. If it is just to improve an existing product, the grant is 30%. Exceptions to this rule are start-up companies which receive 66% of the approved R&D expenditure (up to 6250,000 per year) during the initial two years, and ¢rms in`preferred' development areas receiving 60% of the approved R&D budget. The vast majority of the projects are supported at 50%: essentially, ¢rms match the R&D subsidy dollar-by-dollar.
When a government-assisted R&D project results in a commercially successful product, the developers are obliged to pay royalties. The royalties are a percentage of the revenues derived from the project going from 3% during the ¢rst three years to 4^5% in later years. In any case, the royalties shall not exceed the amount of the grant plus interest. Thus, the grant or subsidy is, in fact, a loan to be paid back only if the project generates enough sales.
The OCS uses the proceeds of the royalties to fund future R&D projects. The share of royalties received out of total grants has been increasing very rapidly from about 10% in 1990 to 16% in 1995 and 32% in 1999 , and is therefore becoming a very important element in the OCS annual budget for R&D support (Trajtenberg, 2002) .
In addition to the`standard' R&D grant, the OCS also gives grants for the execution of detailed feasibility studies regarding the marketing potential of R&D projects and funds the formation of business plans for start-up and young companies based upon the conclusions of the feasibility studies. Grants are also given to assist in the creation of beta-sites, mostly overseas, to test the new product in`real life' situations. The OCS also implements bi-national programs supporting joint projects between companies or individual researchers.
A further two channels used by the government to fund R&D activities via the OCS is through the Magnet Program which supports the establishment of R&D consortia to carry out research in generic precompetitive technologies, and through the establishment of technological incubators that enable novice entrepreneurs with innovative concepts to translate their ideas into commercial products. Starting in 1992, the government also proved instrumental in developing venture capital funds that play an increasingly pivotal role in the evolution of the high-tech industry in Israel.
The value of grants administered by the OCS in all its programs was 120 (current) million dollars in 1988; it increased steeply up to the mid 1990's and then leveled o¡ at about 350^400 (current) million dollars per year. The number of ¢rms applying for subsidies per year varied between 450 and 780 during 1990^1999, and over 6,600 projects have been approved since 1995.
II(ii). Description of the Data
The data used in this paper are a subset of the data analyzed in Griliches and Regev (2001 ¢rm-level data on sales, exports, employment, total R&D expenditures, R&D subsidies, and other characteristics on approximately 180^190 R&D-active ¢rms per year. The data on R&D subsidies are the data obtained directly from the Survey of Research and Development questionnaire. The survey breaks down the external sources of R&D support into three categories: (1) grants from the OCS at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, (2) ¢nancing from the bi-national Israel-American Fund, and (3) ¢nancing from other government sources. We consider all three sources together and label them`R&D subsidies'. As mentioned in the introduction, the OCS subsidy program is the largest form of subsidization. During the sample period, grants from the OCS accounted for about 87% of all government support.
It is important to realize that the R&D expenditures and R&D subsidy data are at the ¢rm level and may involve one or more projects. Moreover, there is no information in our dataset on ¢rms that applied for subsidies and were denied. These ¢rms cannot be distinguished from those that do not apply for subsidies.
8
In Table I , we observe that company ¢nanced R&D expenditures increased in every year throughout the 1990^95 period, even though most of this increase occurred between 1992 and 1993. Their annual rate of growth was 7.2%. This pace was matched, on average, by the growth in R&D subsidies at 8.4% at an annual rate. As a result, the ratio of R&D subsidies to total R&D expenditures remained stable at about 20%.
The subsidy ratio in Table I does not di¡erentiate among ¢rms receiving and not receiving subsidies. The number of ¢rms with positive R&D in the sample hovers around 165^195 per year and about 60% of them receive some kind of subsidy (Table II) . Among the supported ¢rms, the mean subsidy ratio is about 30% in the ¢rst years of the sample but appears to be declining over time.
9 Median subsidy ratios (not shown) are almost identical to the mean ratios. Subsidized R&D represented, on average, 63% of company ¢nanced R&D in 1991, and was down to 48% in 1995. Thus, R&D subsidies constitute a signi¢cant portion of the R&D e¡ort of manufacturing ¢rms. Evidently, subsidies are not a marginal source of funding.
Most of the R&D activity in the manufacturing sector is undertaken by subsidized ¢rms, highlighting the role of the OCS in the development of the Israeli high-tech sector.
10 Non-subsidized ¢rmsöabout 40% of all R&D ¢rmsöaccount for only 10^15% of total R&D expenditures. Ninety-¢ve per cent of all R&D is performed by ¢rms in the electronics and chemical industries. It is therefore not surprising that essentially all R&D grants in the manufacturing sector are received by ¢rms in these two industries.
The data reveal that subsidized ¢rms are larger than non-subsidized ¢rms. They spend, on average, about 5.5^8.5 millions of 1990 NIS in R&D, and employ around 400 employees.
11 Non-subsidized ¢rms, on the other hand, spend considerably less in R&Dö1.5^2.0 millions of 1990 NISöand employ about half the number of workers of their subsidized counterparts. The di¡erences persist, although less signi¢cantly, after controlling for ¢rm size. Although suggestive, these di¡erences are likely to be biased estimates of the subsidy e¡ect because they do not account for the endogeneity of the R&D subsidy (see Section 3).
One of the distinguishing features of the R&D program in Israel is that the distribution of subsidies is highly skewed among R&D performers. Indeed, the largest 25% of the ¢rms receive about 70^80% of all subsidies. On the other hand, small ¢rmsöemploying less than 100 workersöreceive at most 12% of all R&D subsidies, even though they represent about half the ¢rms doing R&D. This suggests that the performance of the R&D subsidy program as a whole may be tied to the fortunes of the largest ¢rms. It is, therefore, of interest to allow for a di¡erential e¡ect of R&D subsidies by ¢rm size.
In short, about 60% of the R&D performers receive some kind of subsidy, which on average represents 30% of the ¢rm's total R&D expenditures and, therefore, constitutes a signi¢cant source of funding for R&D projects. Subsidized ¢rms are on average larger (in terms of employment and R&D size) and more R&D intensive than non-subsidized ¢rms, and almost all subsidized ¢rms belong to the electronics and chemical industries. Most of the R&D activity in the manufacturing sector is conducted by ¢rms receiving some R&D subsidy, but the distribution of subsidies is highly skewed towards the largest ¢rms.
iii. the r&d subsidy effect
As stated in the introduction, this paper examines the e¡ect of R&D subsidies on the level of company ¢nanced R&D expenditures. Speci¢cally, we ask whether receiving a subsidy stimulates or crowds out private R&D expenditures. We will deal ¢rst with some conceptual issues arising in the analysis of the e¡ects of the R&D subsidy and them move on to the problems that arise in trying to measure and estimate these e¡ects.
III(i). Conceptual Issues
A subsidy may stimulate private R&D expenditures for several reasons. The ¢rst one is, naturally, related to the`matching' feature of the R&D subsidy program. Other things equal, this requirement should lead to an increase in private R&D expenditures by the subsidized ¢rms. This is probably the rationale behind the subsidy scheme in Israel. Second, an R&D subsidy to a particular project may turn other potential R&D projects into pro¢table investments. This may happen when the subsidized project involves setting up or upgrading research facilities, lowering the ¢xed costs of other current (and future) R&D projects. Finally, there may also be a spillover of learning and know-how gained in the subsidized project to other current (and future) R&D projects, increasing their prospects of success and thereby their pro¢tability. Thus, the spillover and`cost-sharing' e¡ects of the subsidy, in addition to the built-in matching incentives, should encourage further company ¢nanced R&D expenditures.
Sometimes, however, things can go wrong. If the ¢rm would have undertaken a particular subsidized R&D project (at the same level of do r&d subsidies stimulate private r&d?activity) even if the subsidy had not been granted, then the subsidy is super£uous from the granting agency's point of view. The subsidy would be fully crowding out private R&D expenditures. Thus, the matching features of the subsidy program would indeed guarantee an increase in company ¢nanced R&D only if the approved projects are those that would not have been undertaken without the subsidy. This vital piece of information is, of course, usually unknown to the granting agency (the OCS in Israel).
The reasoning above is based upon the implicit assumption that the ¢rm does not readjust its portfolio of R&D projects after receiving a subsidy, i.e., that other things are equal. This is an overly strong and unrealistic assumption. For example, even when the subsidy is super£uous, the private funds released by the subsidy could be used in their totality to fund other R&D projects leaving private R&D expenditures unchanged. Moreover, suppose that receiving a subsidy carries some signal value which lowers the cost of new funds. Then the ¢rm may start new projects or accelerate existing ones and thereby increase privately ¢nanced R&D expenditures. This may occur even if the subsidy to a particular project is super£uous.
On the other hand, private R&D expenditures may decrease even when the subsidized project would not have been undertaken without the subsidy. Suppose that the ¢rm lacks enough skilled R&D workers or faces some liquidity constraints that make it very costly to implement the nonsubsidized projects along with the subsidized project to which it is committed. The ¢rm may ¢nd it pro¢table to discontinue some of the nonsubsidized projects thereby contributing to a reduction in company ¢nanced R&D expenditures.
Thus, ¢rms may react di¡erently to the R&D subsidy depending, essentially, on their R&D portfolio and budget constraints. Theory alone cannot answer the question posed at the beginning of this section. Whether R&D subsidies stimulate or crowd out private R&D expenditures is, therefore, an empirical matter.
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12 Note also that we restricted ourselves to the e¡ect of the subsidy on the ¢rm's own R&D expenditures. Subsidies may also carry implications towards other non-R&D activities, both contemporaneously and over time, and, through inter¢rm spillovers or rivalry channels, subsidies may have e¡ects on other ¢rms' R&D activities. These, however, are all indirect e¡ects which are not the main goal of the R&D subsidy program (except for its e¡ects on employment). If the direct e¡ects on the subsidized R&D project are negative or not signi¢cant, the economic justi¢cation for continuing with the subsidy program in its present form is considerably undermined even if the indirect e¡ects are quantitatively more important than the direct e¡ects. There are more e¡ective ways of generating the indirect e¡ects than through R&D subsidies.
III(ii) Measurement Issues
For illustration purposes, we focus on the e¡ect of receiving a subsidy on company ¢nanced R&D expenditures. In the empirical work, however, we also analyze the e¡ect of the level of the subsidy on R&D. Let D it 1 represent the event of ¢rm i receiving a subsidy in period t and let y it denote the log of company ¢nanced R&D expenditures.
13 Let y 1 it and y 0 it be the log of company ¢nanced R&D expenditures when the ¢rm received an did not receive a subsidy, respectively. Note that, for a given ¢rm iY we either observe y it is missing for the subsidized ¢rms. We can, however, de¢ne an average e¡ect and attempt to estimate its components. Let Ey 1 it jD it 1Y D itÀ1 0 be the average or expected R&D expenditures among ¢rms that received a subsidy in period t but did not receive a subsidy in the previous period t À 1X Similarly, let Ey 0 it jD it 1Y D itÀ1 0 be the expected R&D expenditures that would have been incurred by these same ¢rms had they not received a subsidy at tX Then,
The parameter a measures the average percentage change in company ¢nanced R&D expenditures between what was actually observed among ¢rms that received a subsidy at time t and what these ¢rms would have spent had the subsidy not been received. 14 When a b 0 the subsidy stimulates average company ¢nanced R&D. Using ¢rm-level data, instead of project-level data, does not allow us to identify the precise mechanisms through which private R&D changes. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the increase in y may well be the result of the launching of new projects that would not have been undertaken without 13 A drawback of using the binary indicator variable D to estimate the subsidy e¡ect is that it does not re£ect the size of the R&D subsidy. The use of logs is motivated, in part, by this scale problem. We will address this issue when analyzing the e¡ect of the level of the subsidy instead of the e¡ect of D.
14 These expectations can be de¢ned conditional on ¢rms' characteristics (e.g., industry a¤liation, size, technological area, etc.). The subsidy e¡ect may, therefore, vary with these characteristics. This average subsidy e¡ect is known in the evaluation literature as the`e¡ect of treatment on the treated'. the subsidy, but it can also result from the use of the funds released by the receipt of the subsidy to fund a larger project that could not have been implemented before the subsidy funds became available.
When a 0, the subsidy does not, on average, displace nor stimulate private R&D expenditures. The ¢rm adjusts its portfolio of R&D projects to accommodate the subsidized project which it is committed to perform. The trade-o¡ between the subsidized and non-subsidized projects balanceso¡ on average.
On the other hand, a`0 means that the subsidy is displacingö crowding outöprivate R&D e¡ort. This can happen when, for example, some of the released resources from subsidizing a super£uous project are invested in non-R&D activities such as marketing, production, etc. A negative a may also occur when the subsidized project purely crowds out other non-subsidized projects due, for example, to the very steep costs of hiring new R&D personnel.
In short, the sign of a gives us information on the qualitative aspect of the relationship between subsidies and private R&D.
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Another possibility for assessing the e¡ect of the R&D subsidy is to look at the performance of ¢rms after the subsidy has been discontinued. That is, we could have compared the R&D expenditures of a ¢rm without a subsidy to the expenditures the ¢rm would have incurred had the subsidy been continued, Ey 0 it À y 1 it jD it 0Y D itÀ1 1X Doing this, however, is uninformative regarding the e¡ectiveness of the subsidy program. To see this, assume that the £ow of R&D subsidies stops because the project is completedX Then the e¡ect being estimated is the e¡ect of the outcome of the R&D project, and not the e¡ect of the subsidy itself. Knowledge of what a ¢rm would have done were the subsidy to be continued tells us nothing on whether the subsidized project would have been undertaken in the ¢rst place in the absence of the subsidy.
III(iii). Estimation Issues
The estimation problem is that data on ¢rms receiving support identify Ey 1 it jD it 1Y D itÀ1 0 but cannot identify the counterfactual Ey 0 it jD it 1Y D itÀ1 0. The estimator of the parameter a essentially attempts to estimate the expected counterfactual by averaging the R&D expenditures of some group of ¢rms.
We illustrate this basic estimation problem by analyzing the most naive estimator of aX Suppose we use the mean R&D expenditures of the nonsupported ¢rms, Ey 0 it jD it 0Y D itÀ1 0Y as an estimator of the counter- 15 Note that when a 0Y total R&D expenditures (private plus subsidized) increase by the size of the subsidy, whereas when a b 0 (a`0 total R&D expenditures increase by more (less) than the subsidy. where the means are taken over the two groups of ¢rms de¢ned by the subsidy status in period t, conditional on not having received a subsidy at t À 1.
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The estimator a D t is the simple di¡erence in mean own R&D expenditures by support status. Of course, this estimator is unbiased as long as the estimator of the counterfactual is unbiased. This occurs when y
i.e., there are no systematic di¡erences in R&D expenditures between subsidized and non-subsidized ¢rms. As observed in Section 2, however, the two groups of subsidized and non-subsidized ¢rms di¡er in many aspects (e.g., in size and industry a¤liation) that are most likely to a¡ect both the level of R&D expenditures directly and the probability of receiving a subsidy. Thus, the di¡erence in mean R&D by support status is not only capturing the causal e¡ect of the subsidy but also part of the e¡ect of the excluded determinants of R&D and D.
For example, if R&D subsidies are biased towards ¢rms in electronics, and in this area R&D expenditures are much larger than in other research ¢elds then the bias term would be positive and the simple di¡erence in means by support status overestimates the casual e¡ect of the R&D subsidy. In the same vein, suppose that liquidity-constrained ¢rms are more likely to apply foröand to receiveöan R&D subsidy and to tighten their R&D expenditures. Then we would expect the bias term to be negative and the simple di¡erence in means by subsidy status will underestimate the causal e¡ect of the R&D subsidy. In these examples, the independence assumption of R&D expenditures and subsidy support status cannot be sustained. The correlation between subsidies and R&D is not causal; it is due to a third factor a¡ecting both decisions. Therefore, assumption (3) is overly strong and is bound to fail in the data.
The above examples suggest that if one could`control' or`account' for the ¢rm's industry, or for the ¢rm's cash-£ow, the simple di¡erence in mean R&D expenditures by support status would be an unbiased estimator of aX Indeed, if controlling for ¢rms' characteristics through the use of appropriate covariates eliminates all the di¡erences in potential own R&D expenditures among supported and non-supported ¢rms then the missing counterfactual can be consistently estimated by the mean R&D expenditures of the non-subsidized ¢rms. This is the`selection on observables' assumption whereby selection into the R&D subsidy program is based on a set of observable variables that are controlled for. This approach is implemented by essentially computing (2) at each value of the covariates.
In general, however, we do not have data on all the relevant covariates. In particular, there are unobservable characteristics that cannot be controlled for which may lead to the failure of the`selection on observables' assumption. For example, the technological state of the ¢rm is likely to a¡ect R&D expenditures and may also a¡ect the probability of receiving an R&D subsidy. In order to overcome this identi¢cation problem inherent in non-experimental data, we need to impose restrictions on the process generating the data.
A ¢rst restriction is to assume linearity of the conditional expectation function EyjxY DY where x is a vector of covariates and D is the subsidy indicator. A second restriction is to assume that the unobserved characteristics can be decomposed into a ¢rm-speci¢c and time-speci¢c e¡ect. This leads to an error-component speci¢cation. These assumptions imply that we can write,
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y it x H it b aD it y i l t Z it where x it is a vector of covariates, y i is the ¢rm-speci¢c e¡ect, l t is a time-speci¢c component common to all ¢rms, and Z it is an iXiXdX zero mean random variable assumed to be mean independent of x it .
Under certain conditions, it can be shown that the coe¤cient of D in (4) is indeed equal to the parameter de¢ned in (1). 17 Taking ¢rst di¡erences of model (4) removes ¢rm-speci¢c e¡ects and, conditioning on not having received a subsidy at t À 1Y i.e., on D itÀ1 0Y implies that the expected di¡erence between the growth rates of subsidized and non-subsidized ¢rms is
It is clear now that, conditional on Dx it and on
This condition is implied by the requirement that Z it and Z itÀ1 be mean independent of D it (conditional on Dx and on D itÀ1 0. The di¡erence-indi¡erence (DID) estimator of a is the sample version of (5).
The contrast between assumptions (3) and (6) is that the latter allows for ¢rm-speci¢c unobserved e¡ects y i (e.g., unobserved managerial skills or time-invariant e¤ciency levels) and economy-wide shocks l t to a¡ect both the level of company ¢nanced R&D expenditures and the support status of the ¢rm. We can do this because the additivity assumption in (4) implies that`same-¢rm' di¡erences eliminate the ¢rm-e¡ects terms whilè same-period' di¡erences eliminate the time e¡ects from the bias. In other words, the panel features of the data and the error component assumption permit us to relax the`selection on observables' assumption to allow for correlation between (time-invariant) ¢rm-speci¢c and time-speci¢c e¡ects and the subsidy dummy variable D.
This issue is closely related to the bias in the estimation of a attributed to the self-selection of ¢rms into the application process of the R&D subsidy program (Busom, 2000) . Not all ¢rms apply for a subsidy. Firms decide to apply for a subsidy on the basis of their expected pro¢tability of applying relative to not applying. Because grants are repaid only if success is achieved, it is possible that ¢rms working in riskier R&D areas will be more likely to apply for subsidies. For this and other reasons, ¢rms receiving an R&D subsidy may not constitute a random sample of ¢rms from the population of R&D doers. Because the characteristics that make a ¢rm a recipient of an R&D subsidy are likely to be correlated with the determinants of own R&D e¡ort, we need to control for this potential source of correlation.
DID with covariates goes some ways towards solving this problem. First, it accounts for common observed covariates a¡ecting the decisions to apply for a subsidy, to be granted one, and to do R&D. Second, it also takes account of permanent (time-invariant) di¡erences between successful and unsuccessful applicants, and non-applicants. Thus, if one believes that part of the self-selection mechanism works through the observed covariates (e.g., industry, size) and that, given these covariates, what determines whether or not a ¢rm is granted a subsidy are ¢rm characteristics that stay more or less constant during the sample period (such as the degree of risk in the R&D area in which the ¢rm is involved), then the DID estimator is an acceptable estimation procedure.
The DID approach handles the problem caused by the notion that morè successful' ¢rms may be receiving more R&D subsidies and doing more R&D. If the`success' pro¢le of the ¢rm is more or less constant during the sample period then it di¡erences-out in the DID estimator. DID fails, however, when receiving an R&D subsidy is associated with the unexpected development of a particularly good idea which also leads to more R&D expenditures. In this case, the DID estimator is likely to be upward biased. In general DID does not control for idiosyncratic factors a¡ecting simultaneously the level of R&D expenditures and the probability of receiving a subsidy, i.e., when D it is correlated with Z it . do r&d subsidies stimulate private r&d?
Some of the features of the subsidy program, however, suggest that selection bias may not be a very serious problem in the Israeli context. First, the OCS is mandated by law to subsidize all eligible proposals. Second, what makes a proposed project`eligible' is to satisfy a set of basic technological and commercial feasibility criteria. In particular, the selection procedure at the OCS is non-competitive, i.e., there is no ranking of the proposals. All in all, about 70% of all applications are approved (Trajtenberg, 2002) . 18 
iv. empirical results
The DID estimator equals the di¡erence between the mean R&D change between t À 1 and t among the supported and non-supported ¢rms, conditional on x and on not having received a subsidy at t À 1. A convenient way to control for di¡erent values of xY is to estimate a from (4) in two consecutive years using panel data estimation methods. Speci¢cally, we need data for two periods, a`pre-treatment' period and a`post-treatment' period. A ¢xed-e¡ects estimator of (4) generates consistent estimators of a and b provided the identifying assumptions hold.
To improve the precision of the estimator, we pool the data over the 6 years of data in the sample using only observations for which D itÀ1 0X For example, for the year 1991 we use data on ¢rms not receiving a subsidy in 1990, for the year 1992 we select ¢rms that did not receive a subsidy in 1991, and so on. There are 325 such observations over the years 1991^1995 whereas the original sample has 1,098 ¢rm-year observations (see Table II ). These observations correspond to 136 ¢rms. 183 of the 325 observations belong to 67 ¢rms that never received a subsidy during the ¢ve years 1991^95. Similarly, 8 observations belong to 8 ¢rms receiving a subsidy every year during 1991^95 (but not in 1990).
19 Thus, about half the ¢rms in this sample received a subsidy at least once. Because this is the sample upon which our estimates are based, Table III presents statistics on the main variables of interest.
Firms spent on average about 2 million NIS with the larger ¢rmsö¢rms with more than 300 employeesöspending about 5 times as much as the smaller ¢rms. The average level of R&D subsidies is only 31,000 NIS for 18 We only observe recipient and non-recipient ¢rms in the data. A recipient ¢rm is one that applied and was accepted to the subsidy program, the non-recipient ¢rm may have applied for a subsidy and been denied or may not have applied at all. The data at hand do not allow us to distinguish between denied applicants and non-applicants. See also footnote 8. 19 The remaining 134 observations are distributed as follows: 46 belong to 16 ¢rms receiving a subsidy only once, 45 belong to 17 ¢rms receiving a subsidy two times, 25 belong to 15 ¢rms receiving a subsidy three times, and 18 belong to 13 ¢rms receiving a subsidy four times during 1990^95. the smaller ¢rms but jumps to 223,000 NIS for the larger ¢rms. The high standard deviations point to the large variations across ¢rms in these two variables.
Table IV presents the ¢rst set of estimates on a based on model (4) using employment and sales to control for the e¡ect on R&D of observable ¢rm characteristics that may be correlated with the probability of receiving an R&D subsidy. Industry a¤liation and other constant-over-time variables drop out in the estimation. The size variablesöemployment and salesö may capture some of the e¡ect of liquidity constraints.
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In columns (1)^(3), the subsidy e¡ect comes in negative and of considerable sizeöabout À16%öbut statistically not signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero at conventional signi¢cance levels. The subsidy does not appear to have any e¡ect on private R&D expenditures.
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Not surprisingly, larger ¢rms spend more on R&D expenditures but the size elasticity of R&D is well below unity implying that company ¢nanced R&D by employee decrease with the size of the ¢rm. To test whether there is a di¡erence in the subsidy response of large and small ¢rms, a term interacting the subsidy and a`large ¢rm' dummy for ¢rms with more than 300 employeesöwas added to the regression. The estimated coe¤cient of this interaction term (not shown) was À0.099 but not signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero. Splitting the sample into small and large ¢rms (columns (4) and (5)) does not alter the picture much: the estimated subsidy e¡ects are negative but very imprecisely estimated. Nevertheless, the estimated a is much more negative for the larger ¢rms. Klette and Moen (1997) relate optimal R&D expenditures to expected pro¢tability (proxied by sales) and subsidies. Because employment and sales are highly collinear usually only one of the regressors comes in positive and signi¢cant. 21 The year-to-year estimates of equation (4) appear in Table 9 of the working paper version of this paper (Lach, 2000) . Although, there is much variation across the years in the estimates, these are qualitatively the same as those in the pooled sample. do r&d subsidies stimulate private r&d?
Note that the`within' R 2 öwhere ¢rm variables are taken in deviation from their time meanöare about 4^5% indicating that most of the within¢rm variation in own R&D expenditures is largely unrelated to changes over time in scale (except maybe for the large ¢rms) or to the receipt of R&D subsidies.
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Partly because of the disappointing ¢t of this simple model and partly because we want to exploit the availability of complete data on the subsidies we now expand the basic framework to account for the level of the subsidy received.
As in Wallsten (2000), we use the levels of R&D expenditures and of the R&D subsidy, and not their natural logarithms, to capture the hypothesized`one-to-one' additionality relationship between them. We will omit the sales variable from the regression because it is highly correlated with employment (their simple correlation coe¤cient in the sample used is 0.91). Table V presents these results.
Note ¢rst that the ¢t of the model is very much improved. More importantly, the estimates now reveal that for every subsidized NIS received, the ¢rm reduces its own expenditures on R&D by about 2.5 NIS, on average. This is a large and signi¢cant displacement e¡ect. The e¡ect is more precisely estimated for the smaller ¢rms (at about 3 NIS of private R&D displaced per subsidized NIS) than for the larger ¢rms whose estimated displacement e¡ect, even though numerically larger, is not signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero.
This large negative e¡ect may re£ect the fact that once the subsidy is received the ¢rm is committed to implement the subsidized project. In an economic environment characterized by serious skilled R&D labor shortages, as was typical in Israel during the sample period, this commitment may lead ¢rms to temporarily scale down other nonsubsidized R&D projects. The estimates suggest that this disinvestment Standard errors in parentheses. Year and ¢rm dummies included. A *(**) indicates di¡erent from 0 at 5(10)% signi¢cance level. 22 The standard R 2 's (not shown) were in the order of 90%.
was large enough for private R&D expenditures to decrease considerably after the subsidized project was started. This interpretation of the large negative subsidy e¡ect would be more credible if the crowding out e¡ect is indeed temporary. Indeed, as suggested in Section 3.1, the e¡ect of the subsidy may be spread over several periods. This suggests that lags of the subsidy should be added to the regression in order to capture the full e¡ect of the subsidies on private R&D.
23 Table VI adds one lag of the subsidy indicator to the regression.
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The results change dramatically. For the smaller ¢rms, a one NIS subsidy does indeed displace private R&D expenditures by about 3.0 NIS but this substitution is completely reversed later on. A year after receiving the subsidy, own R&D expenditures increase on average by 13.5 NIS. These two estimates are quite precisely estimated. Adding both estimates we get a strong and signi¢cant stimulating e¡ect of the R&D subsidies of 10.8 NIS. For the larger ¢rms, the immediate displacing e¡ect is larger than the subsequent stimulus but neither both e¡ects, nor their sum À3X29 is signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero. 25, 26 These estimates reinforce the interpretation advanced after Table V , namely, that upon receiving an R&D subsidy, a small ¢rm scales down other R&D projects during the ¢rst year of the project in order to focus on Taking into account that about 75% of the subsidies given by the OCS go to large ¢rms, the average e¡ect of a subsidized NIS is to increase own R&D expenditures by 0.23 NIS (10X8 Â X Total R&D expenditures increase, of course, by 1X23 NIS. This is not a large e¡ect. Moreover, it is not signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero because of the very imprecise estimated e¡ect for the large ¢rms. 27 Taken at face value, these estimates suggest that in order to increase private R&D activity, the subsidy funds should be redirected to the small ¢rms.
v. conclusions
This paper analyzes the e¡ects of R&D subsidies on company ¢nanced R&D using data on Israeli manufacturing ¢rms during 1990^1995. The R&D subsidy e¡ect is de¢ned as the average change in company ¢nanced R&D expenditures between what was actually observed among ¢rms that received a subsidy and what these ¢rms would have spent had the subsidy not been received.
We posit a variety of channels through which the subsidy operates. Some of these channels a¡ect private R&D positively and some a¡ect it negatively. The paper focuses on estimating the net e¡ect of the subsidy on private R&D; the distribution of these e¡ects through the di¡erent channels is left for future research.
The empirical approach uses a DID-type estimator to estimate the e¡ect 27 Its standard deviation is 6.5 assuming zero covariance between the estimates in the two sub-samples. of receiving an R&D subsidy and of its level on company ¢nanced R&D expenditures. We ¢nd evidence suggesting that the R&D subsidies granted by the OCS greatly stimulated company ¢nanced R&D expenditures for small ¢rms but had a negative e¡ect on the R&D of large ¢rms, although the latter is not statistically signi¢cant. For the small ¢rms, a subsidy of one NIS increases their R&D by about 11 NIS. These estimates suggest that subsidy funds should be diverted towards the small ¢rms. Currently, because most subsidies go to the large ¢rms, a subsidy of one NIS generates, on average, a statistically insigni¢cant 0.23 additional NIS of company ¢nanced R&D. The estimates suggest that private R&D activity could be increased by shifting subsidy funds to small ¢rms. One interpretation of these results is that large ¢rms get subsidies for projects that would have been undertaken even in the absence of the subsidy, whereas small ¢rms use the subsidies to fund projects that would not have been undertaken without them. This di¡erential e¡ect of the subsidy may re£ect a higher cots of raising capital by small ¢rms than by large ¢rms. The time pattern of the estimated e¡ects also suggests that in the presence of some type of constraint (either capital or skilled labor), the commitment to undertake the subsidized R&D project may result in other R&D projects being temporarily crowded out. 
